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Summary 
 
In literature, there has been little empirical research investigation on purchasing consortium 
issues focusing on a detailed analysis of ICT-based procurement strategies. Based on the 
exploration of academic literature and a survey on e-Marketplaces / procurement service 
providers (PSPs) in the automotive and electronics industry sectors, an overall statement is 
proposed: Effective participation in electronic purchasing consortia can have the potential to 
enhance competitive advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear and detailed 
understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the e-Marketplace / PSP level of 
analysis. 
Keywords: E-Procurement, Electronic Purchasing Consortia, Demand Aggregation, 
Supply Chain Management 
 
Educator & Practitioner Summary 
 
Electronic purchasing consortia are still in their infancy and research is still in conceptual and 
theoretical flux. These realities indicate the necessity for further empirical analysis by 
conceptualising major process structures and drivers at the e-Marketplace/ PSP level of 
analysis, which is addressed at academics and purchasing professionals alike.  
 
Introduction 
 
Strategic management of global procurement operations has become an increasingly 
important research issue. One of the main reasons is the concentration on core competencies 
at the company level, which led to a significant increase of sourcing activities. Therefore, 
procurement savings can hold significant business value and impact on profit. However, 
organisations can have negotiated to the lowest procurement price available according to 
volume. It then becomes necessary to look at other possibilities, such as forming purchasing 
consortia. According to Hendrick (1997), a purchasing consortium is “a formal or informal 
arrangement, where two or more organisations, who are separate legal entities, collaborate 
among themselves, or through a third party, to combine their individual needs for products 
from suppliers and to gain the increased pricing, quality, and service advantages associated 
with volume buying”. Essig (1999) notes that a purchasing consortium may be just one 
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element of a supply strategy and may be combined with other effective sourcing strategies 
such as global sourcing, single sourcing, system sourcing, among others. Within the policies 
and strategies, Arnold (1996) states that three types of co-operation can be differentiated in 
supply management. He defines a purchasing consortium as a horizontal supply co-operation 
and this he calls the third type of co-operation in supply management  (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Types of Co-operation in Supply Management 
 
Source: Derived from Arnold (1996), p. 1359. 
In the literature however, there has been little empirical research investigation on purchasing 
consortium issues focusing on a detailed analysis of ICT-based procurement strategies. 
Electronic purchasing consortia (EPC) facilitate purchasing organisations, to a varying 
degree, to electronically conduct tasks that are necessary for the management of demand 
aggregation of two or more legal entities, and provide Internet-based communication 
infrastructures. While research to purchasing consortia is rather well developed (e.g. Arnold, 
1996; Essig, 1999; Hendrick, 1997; Quayle, 2000; Vigoroso, 1998), limited attempts have 
been made to focus on the electronic procurement aspect in this field. Most approaches in 
literature concentrate on e-Marketplaces and e-Procurement in general, but do not refer to 
purchasing consortia. Only Corsten and Zagler (1998) have proceeded with an action research 
project to electronic purchasing consortia. However, their study did not include important 
research issues such as e.g. the empirical level of EPC adoption with regard to industry 
sectors’ structures and anti-trust limitations, a categorisation of EPC management structures 
and scope, revenue models, etc. that are explained and elaborated on in more detail in the 
following. 
Theory Background 
 
Pooled sourcing strategies are not a new concept. However, they have existed in the public 
sector, where co-operative purchasing has been practised in non-profit institutions for more 
than a century. Due to the concentration on core competencies, the trend of industrial 
enterprises concerning the formation of strategic demand aggregation alliances started mainly 
in the last two decades and is described as consortium purchasing (Essig, 1999). However, the 
theoretical foundation for EPC is more complex, going well beyond the field of purchasing. 
As stated by Amit and Zott (2001), no single strategic management theory can fully explain 
the value creation potential of e-Business. They note that rather, an integration of the received 
theoretical perspectives on value creation and a multi-perspective approach is needed, as “(…) 
virtual markets broaden the notion of innovation as they foster new forms of collaboration 
among firms (rather than merely new products or production processes) and involve new 
exchange mechanisms and unique transaction methods”. An integration of strategic 
management theories is required to situate EPC in literature. The resource-based theory (e.g. 
Barney, 1991) and the positioning stream (e.g. Porter, 1985) to competitive advantage have 
not addressed issues where industrial firms have not as such developed critical resources and 
capabilities but in co-operation with other firms. This theoretical perspective suggests that 
competitive advantage can also be developed through inter-firm co-operation and links. That 
is why the theory of strategic networks and alliances (e.g. Gulati, 1998;  Jarillo, 1988), which 
are based on a continuum between market and hierarchy, is very relevant to EPC as a further 
paradigm to competitive advantage. Corsten and Zagler (1998) state that electronic 
purchasing consortia may exploit synergetic potentials of economies of scale and scope (e.g. 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) without the diseconomies of increased transaction and 
communication costs (e.g. Williamson, 1975). EPC as hybrid co-operation form can effect 
economies of scale and scope and are based on the model of transaction and production cost 
theory. Symbiosis is the driver and a prerequisite for successful consortia (Essig, 1999). 
However, the effects are diminishing with increased asset specificity.  The literature review 
on the network and synergy concept can provide a theoretical foundation why electronic 
purchasing consortia are formed. Rozemeijer (2000) argues that synergy is all the new value 
that can be added through organisation and the structure of interrelationships between 
independent units. However, EPC theory requires to integrate virtual structures in strategic 
alliance networks and virtual organisation (e.g. Bakos and Treacy, 1986; Malone et al, 1987), 
dis- and reintermediation (e.g. Wigand and Benjamin, 1996) as well as e-Procurement 
strategies (e.g. Gebauer and Zagler, 2000) to fully explain EPC. Traditionally, lack of 
integration and communication infrastructures were regarded as one of the biggest barriers 
preventing the adoption and success of purchasing consortia. Electronic purchasing consortia, 
as a network enabler, can potentially offer a more efficient communication infrastructure with 
lower transaction costs (Corsten and Zagler, 1998). Electronic support can eliminate some 
inefficiency related to purchasing consortia. Metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and 
procurement service providers can enable firms to adopt effective e-Procurement systems. 
Replacing expensive EDI solutions governed by only one buyer in a closed system, low entry 
costs, fast return on investment and protection of existing EDI investment, recent 
developments in XML-programming, are all reasons for the transformation of the supply 
chain into a network by Internet technologies (Richmond et al, 1998). However, Knudsen 
(2002) points out that there are still some uncertainties as to how the purchasing departments’ 
overall performance can be improved by e-Procurement. E-Procurement solutions and 
concepts are very diverse and have many different meanings.  De Boer et al. (2002) note in 
that respect that the potential merit of those various e-Procurement concepts, such as 
electronic catalogue systems and software, electronic auctions, intelligent agent applications, 
electronic marketplaces, etc., seems largely undisputed (e.g. Croom, 2000; Smelzer and 
Ruzicka, 2000). However, with regard to the wide range of solutions available, many firms 
still struggle with assessing e-Procurement suitability for their purchasing processes and 
mainly adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach. Moreover, there is no one best way to organise for 
purchasing synergy and to improve inter-organisational demand aggregation and purchasing 
co-ordination practices. Therefore, a first classification and categorisation of EPC structures 
and drivers was investigated for this paper (shown in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Classification of Electronic Purchasing Consortia 
 
 
 
 
There is a great variety in EPC approaches to achieve purchasing synergy. Thus, the figure 
probably cannot provide a complete picture, but a valuable starting point for further research 
on EPC. Approaches can range from voluntary informal EPC co-operation among purchasing 
firms to more formally managed co-operation structures (e.g. the laissez-faire model, in which 
a procurement service provider or e-Marketplace can act as a lead source for purchasing 
organisations and suppliers and provides product information, specifications, among others) 
as well as to outsourced solutions (i.e. the mediated operating model, in which a third-party 
negotiates or aggregates demand on behalf of buyers or suppliers). The level of anonymity 
between the EPC partners is a varying parameter that is closely related to the co-operation 
type. When search costs, asset specificity and the benefits from long-term relationships are 
low, buyers and sellers are more likely to interact with virtual anonymity, as is the case in 
highly liquid commodities markets. Another classification involves the type of EPC market 
mechanism and negotiation processes: It was found that several EPC trading and aggregation 
models exist that can range from EPC with electronic requests for quotation (e-RFQ) or 
reverse auctions to pre-production demand aggregation price curves (i.e. multiple buyers can 
electronically aggregate their orders around a supplier's pre-set and pre-production shipping 
date at the expense of additional inventory costs for purchasing organisations), time limited 
buy-cycles (i.e. prices continually amend in pre-set increments and time-frames as new group 
orders are electronically placed), buy-cycles with rebate schemes (a rebate is granted once the 
total number of purchasers has been electronically finalised) to full-service third-party 
intermediaries (although, by definition per se, they do not clearly fall into the EPC continuum 
between market and hierarchy). At the same time, the EPC market mechanisms are linked to 
parameters, which include, but are not limited to, the level of purchasing regularity, product 
customisation, breadth of value adding services, level of co-opetition, that require to be 
researched more closely in the following.  
Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology follows a positivistic approach in order to assess the overall 
statement: Effective participation in electronic purchasing consortia can have the potential to 
enhance competitive advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear and detailed 
understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the e-Marketplace/ PSP level of 
analysis. Therefore, the analysis of the overall statement presents issues such as 
 
- Industry sectors, anti-trust limitations and take-up of electronic purchasing consortia. 
- The level of awareness and importance of electronic purchasing consortia and further 
customised services. 
- Management structures, trading mechanisms and scope of EPC. 
- Revenue models for electronic purchasing consortia. 
- Level of benefits and drawbacks of electronic purchasing consortia. 
- Critical factors in creating and managing electronic purchasing consortia. 
- Relationship between ROI and the use of electronic purchasing consortia and reverse 
auctions. 
 
An online survey instrument for e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers was 
implemented with both forced-choice and open-ended text questions and pre-tested among 
academics and practitioners. Questionnaires were electronically sent to 124 international 
active e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers in the automotive, electronics and 
closely related industries (e.g. metals, plastics). Reasons for the choice of the sectors derive 
from the background that both industries are pioneers and advanced in supply chain 
management and e-Procurement. Organisations in the automotive and electronics industries 
streamline the infrastructure around the logistics chain and synchronise order processing and 
assembly. Due to a consolidation phase and decrease in the population of e-Marketplaces / 
PSPs, 22 of them had terminated their operations and the population was reduced to 102 e-
Marketplaces / PSPs. The procedure to achieve a sufficient response rate and to obtain non-
respondents’ data was an integrative process. First potential respondents were contacted four 
times during the first response period by e-Mail. Next, non-respondents in the surveys were 
contacted by phone and were interviewed on the level of current and future EPC 
implementation. This process could provide the grounding for a non-respondent analysis. 34 
e-Marketplaces / PSPs were willing to provide data to these two questions, but could not be 
motivated during the phone calls for full survey participation. Non-respondents were finally 
contacted up to four attempts by phone so that the full-survey coverage increased to a final 
response rate of 42% (i.e. 43 responses). 24 e-Marketplaces / PSPs were not at all interested 
in the research. This response rate can be considered as very satisfactory in comparison to 
other survey research. The non-response analysis from the 34 participants did not reveal any 
significant differences and indicated that the pattern of responses was reflective of the sample 
frame. Additionally, surveys were tested for statistically significant differences in the 
responses of early and late returned surveys. Again, no significant differences were found, 
suggesting that the sample is representative for the population. The geographic distribution of 
response shows that most participation came from Europe, followed by the US. The 
participating e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers were relatively evenly 
distributed within the automotive and electronics sectors in this survey. All e-Marketplaces 
and PSPs were operated for profit; non-profit organisations did not participate in the survey.  
Results 
 
Electronic purchasing consortia were offered by 19 of the total 43 participating e-
Marketplaces and PSPs (44%). EPC are offered less in the automotive industry (39%) than in 
the electronics industry (65%) E-Marketplaces and PSPs that offer electronic purchasing 
consortia tend to be buyer-centric. Overall, e-Marketplaces in general provide electronic 
purchasing consortia only in limited cases. Only 27% of e-Marketplaces provide EPC in 
comparison to 82% of PSPs. The findings suggest that e-Marketplaces generally still have 
potential to develop and integrate EPC. PSPs as the main group of EPC providers appear that 
they are working together with a relatively small number of purchasing organisations in 
comparison to e-Marketplaces. From the survey, it was learnt that PSPs take advantage of 
semi-automatic or non-electronic communications tools as well that can assist in gaining 
purchasing managers’ trust to participate in electronic purchasing consortia. Few EPC 
providers among e-Marketplaces offer consulting services to establish whether or not 
purchasing organisations would be generally willing to participate in EPC and to institute a 
certain level of trust between potential consortia members. The findings also suggest that 
PSPs, after having established an agreement to EPC, strongly support electronic 
implementation of RFx processes, e.g. conduct a reverse auction. This is one of the reasons 
why the authors have set up the definition of EPC in that they facilitate purchasing 
organisations, to a varying degree, to electronically conduct tasks that are necessary for the 
management of demand aggregation of two or more legal entities, and provide efficient 
Internet-based communication infrastructures. Other non-electronic communications might be 
necessary as well.  
 
Currently, it was found that most e-Marketplaces concentrate on automating purchasing and 
order replenishment processes, whereas PSPs focus more closely on strategic procurement. E-
Marketplaces still have the potential to integrate value-adding activities in strategic sourcing 
such as EPC. None of the industry consortia-led exchanges currently offer any electronic 
purchasing consortia. This appears worth noting because they would already have finished 
decisive phases of EPC such as finding partners, building up trust among the members and 
getting agreements in place. This finding can be explained in such a way that industry 
consortia-led exchanges are set up by the major industry players and therefore demand 
aggregation might not be able to proceed due to anti-trust limitations. 60% of electronic 
purchasing consortia providers have requested legal approval before implementing EPC. The 
average number of competitors against non-competitors in the consortium is approx. 25%. 
This finding confirms that anti-trust is a major consideration to electronic purchasing 
consortia and that is why electronic purchasing consortia today are mostly built by e-
Marketplaces and PSPs for multi-sectoral consortia.  
 
Overall, e-Marketplaces / PSPs specified that there would be an increase of take-up of 
electronic purchasing consortia from 44% to 61% and an increase in the offering of reverse 
auctions from 63% to 79% in the future. Moreover, e-Marketplaces / PSPs indicated a rise in 
the service provision of EPC and reverse auctions at the same time from 28% presently to 
56% in future. This future growth clearly stresses the awareness of both electronic purchasing 
consortia and reverse auctions to e-Marketplaces and PSPs. In particularly, e-Marketplaces 
seem to have realised the potential of EPC and reverse auctions and try to add this 
functionality in future. E-Marketplaces and PSPs that have implemented electronic 
purchasing consortia and reverse auctions regard them as an essential part of their 
functionality and business strategy. However, EPC providers also specified that EPC and 
reverse auctions are just one element of their overall service provision and support them with 
more functionality such as legacy system integration, tracking and tracing, among others. The 
majority of e-Marketplaces and PSPs seem to have realised the potential of more value adding 
services and generally plan to add functionality in future in order to avoid building one-off, 
single-sided functions. Overall, EPC providers today do not have generally more functionality 
than non-providers. E-Marketplaces and PSPs cited the lack of firm participation as critical to 
its service offerings. Other major drawbacks specified for electronic purchasing consortia are 
potential anti-trust issues and that company secrets are perceived by purchasing managers not 
to be kept confidential to competitors. Firms that collaborate, even with non-competitors, may 
fear that firms may be directly or indirectly provided with sensitive competitive information 
(Hendrick, 1997). A high degree of trust among all participants and a strong management 
support are considered as vital factors for electronic purchasing consortia. The statistical 
analysis identified that non-providers of EPC and reverse auctions seem to underestimate the 
critical factors involved in managing EPC. For suppliers, drawbacks cited mainly include that 
the increased transparency in EPC can result in lower margins and more pressure from 
purchasing organisations. That is why strong suppliers, especially of strategic items, may 
resist participating in EPC. Hendrick (1997) explains that by keeping the members of an EPC 
as separate customers, they can extract higher margins that could be negotiated by the group. 
While collaboration with suppliers and other companies is perceived by 95% of all e-
Marketplaces and PSPs as it is getting more important in the future, e-Marketplaces / PSPs 
predominantly offer EPC solutions that focus on a rather transactional, arm’s length buyer-
supplier relationship. While e-Marketplaces and PSPs did not identify improvements in 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships from EPC, they acknowledged benefits for supplier 
such as a quick access to large pools of buyers with lower sales costs and long-term business 
volume. Overall, EPC providers estimate the benefits of EPC on a higher scale and the 
drawbacks on a lower scale than non-providers. Having put EPC in practice, it seems that 
benefits can outweigh the drawbacks. Another factor to be taken into consideration is the 
product pooling potential: E-Marketplaces and PSPs generally estimate that 32% of their 
products could be pooled. Providers of EPC specify an average present product pooling of 
about 15% and acknowledge that there is still some potential to increase their average present 
pooling of products.  
 
In terms of revenue models, providers of both electronic purchasing and reverse auctions do 
not charge solely suppliers at all. 50% of EPC providers charge only buyers; the other half 
charges both suppliers and buyers. Hendrick (1997) found that purchasing consortia have in 
most cases no direct fees and each member contributes expense coverage, time and effort 
about equally. For EPC, there seems to some shift to the payment of expenses based on a 
percentage of purchases and fees paid as a percentage of cost savings. One explanation for 
this finding can be that the fees paid, as a percentage of cost savings, can have more 
immediate benefits and ROI for purchasing organisations. Less financial risk can be involved 
and outsourcing can take precedence. Providers of electronic purchasing consortia specify an 
average saving in purchasing costs of 12.4% with demand aggregation. With EPC, member 
companies have to invest an average of 7.0% of purchasing costs for setting-up and managing 
the electronic purchasing consortium. As a result, an average net saving of 5.4% and a ROI of 
77% can be calculated for companies that participate in EPC. For reverse auctions, a higher 
ROI results: The average savings (in % of purchasing costs) for buyers in reverse auctions 
were 16.1%. The average buyer investment for reverse auctions (in % of purchasing costs) 
was 4.6%. The result is a net saving of 11.6% and a ROI of 254%. However, there usually is a 
cut off point or minimum amount to order to conduct a reverse auction effectively. Providers 
of reverse auctions specify that there should be an average minimum amount of EUR 51,000 
of a specific product demand to run a profitable reverse auction. Providers of both EPC and 
reverse auctions claim to achieve average savings (in % of purchasing costs) of 28.5% by the 
combination of EPC and reverse auctions. The average investment (in % of purchasing costs) 
for both EPC and reverse auctions is 11.1%. Consequently, an average net saving of 17.4% 
and a ROI of 155% results by the combination of both reverse auctions and electronic 
purchasing consortia. Obviously, this tandem can achieve significant profit and ROI. With 
regard to the ROI, reverse auctions have a better potential than EPC. So far, there is no 
statistical validity that that the more services are offered by e-Marketplaces / PSPs, the higher 
the general net savings in purchasing costs achieved with e-Marketplaces and PSPs. Presently, 
providers of EPC and reverse auctions seem to be quite satisfied and positive about electronic 
purchasing consortia and reverse auctions.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
All in all the results demonstrate that, despite some scepticism and drawbacks, electronic 
purchasing consortia, it is perceived, will become more important in the future. The overall 
consensus is positive. New electronic metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and procurement 
service providers have the potential to interpose themselves between suppliers and buyers by 
taking advantage of new types of economies of scale, scope and knowledge, enabled by the 
Internet.  
 
However, the analysis into EPC process structures and drivers among e-Marketplaces / PSPs 
also reveals that major barriers exist to adoption: For example, legal limitations can evolve, 
which are, according to the trade commissions, amenable to traditional anti-trust analysis. 
Competition may be affected by monopsony or oligopsony buyer power. The further EPC 
extend beyond the ‘safe harbour’, which under EU guidelines is fixed at 15%, the greater the 
risk of a negative competitive effect. In the US, if less than 20 percent of a market is affected 
by an exclusive arrangement, the practice will likely avoid regulatory scrutiny because it falls 
within the antitrust safety zone. Anti-trust limitations can be one of the reasons why EPC are 
offered less in the automotive industry (39%) than in the electronics industry (65%). What 
differentiates the electronics industry from the automotive is higher volatile demand, more 
rapid inventory depreciation and a more dynamic character. The electronics industry is not as 
vertically integrated and concentrated as the automotive industry, which makes it a better 
candidate for EPC models. Potential anti-trust limitations are more likely to arise in the 
oligopsonistic automotive industry. For example, the consortia-led e-Marketplace Covisint 
specifies on its website: “First, Covisint will not aggregate the purchases of one OEM with 
those of another OEM. Second, Covisint will not offer aggregated purchasing services for any 
automotive-specific parts or materials. Third, Covisint's future aggregated purchases of non-
automotive specific parts (such as office supplies, cleaning supplies, etc.) will always be 
within the applicable competitive law guidelines in the market in which the purchases are 
made.” By forming EPC within Covisint, several OEMs would dominate the automotive 
purchasing share world-wide. Due to regulatory issues consortia of automotive manufacturers 
will not be allowed to pool their demand for production parts. Nonetheless, Covisint has taken 
a very conservative approach: Demand aggregation between OEMs and tier 1 suppliers (for 
e.g. raw materials) which is common practice in the automotive industry was also not 
integrated. EPC providers have to establish means by which the risks of collusion of anti-trust 
can be ameliorated, e.g. by erecting firewalls to prevent access by competitors to certain 
information or by implementing the use of nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements.  
 
E-Marketplaces / PSPs also cited further challenges to EPC such as a not adequate training 
and education of purchasing managers in EPC, a low degree of information on change 
management and, rather self-critically, a lack of maturity in service offerings. E-Marketplaces 
and PSPs realised that they have to add services and functionality in future. Currently 
available EPC solutions are still some way from covering the entire spectrum of procurement 
requirements. It was also found that e-Procurement of complex modules with high asset 
specificity are more difficult to proceed by EPC because the parts are rarely sourced entirely 
on the basis of price, but on concept competition, supplier capabilities and in most cases 
single sourcing. Lapidus (2000) assumes that only 20% of sales in the automotive industry are 
commodity purchases, which would be more suitable for EPC due to their lower asset 
specificity. Some conflict with electronic purchasing consortia was identified in the 
concentrated auto industry, with its module structure, fierce competition and overcapacity and 
therefore take-up of EPC among e-Marketplaces / PSPs in this industry is relatively low. 
Effective participation in electronic purchasing consortia has the potential to enhance 
competitive advantage in the automotive industry, but this potential is limited due to the 
concentration of the sector (legal issues), cultural impediments and technical factors 
(modularised assembly). More horizontal integrated and fragmented industry sectors such as 
the electronics industry are better suited to adopt EPC. Moreover, the electronics industry 
with its high-velocity product cycles and swings in demand have aggressively embraced 
outsourcing, contract manufacturing and reintermediation, thereby contributing to the higher 
level of EPC implementation. However, e-Marketplaces / PSPs further specified that many 
purchasing organisations have not yet evolved to the stage where they are joining e-
Marketplaces / PSPs in any significant numbers. They will have to overcome this fundamental 
hurdle before strategic sourcing teams are joining EPC and applying strategic leverage on the 
supply base.  
 
Conclusions 
 
From the research, it is apparent that EPC, despite limitations, can be a valuable strategic tool 
worth consideration inside an integrated supply chain model. While dependant on industry 
sector characteristics, the model of electronic purchasing consortia can represent a strategic 
procurement direction for the future and is developing in an evolutionary rather than in a 
revolutionary manner. However, much work still needs to be carried out if the use of this type 
of electronic network is to be more widely adopted. Therefore, further research on EPC will 
be conducted by means of a second survey on a sample of 400 purchasing organisations in the 
automotive and electronics industry. 
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